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OBLIGATIONS
H. Alston Johnson III*
SOLIDARITY
Imperfect Solidarity?
Motorcycle riding can be hazardous to the consistency of
the law. This little known scientific fact was demonstrated
during the last term in Gremillion v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.1 Plaintiff wife was riding as a pas-
senger on a motorcycle being driven by her husband, and was
injured when he negligently2 drove the cycle into a roadside
ditch. The cycle was owned by the wife's father, but he car-
ried no insurance on it.3 The husband carried two automobile
policies, but the jurisprudence appears to be 4 that a motorcy-
cle is not included in the definition of a "non-owned au-
tomobile" being driven by an insured for liability coverage
purposes. Had the husband chosen an automobile to drive
rather than a motorcycle, his policies would have afforded
coverage, and the wife could have brought a direct action
against the insurer under well-settled jurisprudence.5
But he didn't, and therefore she couldn't. Thus, the wife
had been injured at the hands of an uninsured motorist, who
also happened to be her husband. She sued her husband's
insurer under its uninsured motorist coverage, seeking re-
covery for her injuries up to the policy limit. Her husband
joined her suit for penalties and attorney's fees for arbitrary
refusal to pay his wife, a demand eventually rejected.
The insurer denied liability to the wife under the unin-
sured motorist clause of the policy because it had agreed to
pay only those sums which the wife, as an insured, "shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 302 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 134 (1974).
2. The husband's negligence was determined at trial and affirmed by the
appellate court and does not form a part of this discussion.
3. Accordingly, the possibility of the husband's being an omnibus insured
on a policy insuring the father as named insured was not present.
4. Guillory v. Deshotel, 251 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
259 La. 810, 253 So. 2d 67 (1971); Labove v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 219 So.
2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 La. 22, 222 So. 2d 69 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Edwards v. Royal Indemn. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
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operator of an uninsured automobile. '6 The insurer argued
that since the wife could not have recovered anything from
her husband due to the statute creating interspousal immu-
nity from such a suit, 7 she was not a person "legally entitled to
recover" from the uninsured motorist and thus could not re-
cover under the uninsured motorist provision. In the alterna-
tive, the insurer contended that it should be entitled to judg-
ment on its reconventional demand against the husband for
any amount which it might be compelled to pay to the wife,
based upon its statutory right to recover sums expended in
compensation to the wife from any person "legally responsi-
ble" for the damage." To this reconventional demand the hus-
band interposed a peremptory exception, pleading inter-
spousal immunity. On a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court rejected the insurer's arguments on both issues.
These matters formed the principal dispute on appeal, where
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Lengthy exposition of the insurance coverage issues is
not appropriate here, but some brief discussion is needed to
understand the problem. It is, of course, well settled that a
spouse may sue the other spouse's insurer, in a direct action
under the liability coverage afforded by the policy, for dam-
ages allegedly caused by the insured spouse's negligence; and
the insurer is not entitled to plead interspousal immunity as
a defense, it being personal to the insured spouse.9 Because a
direct action is permitted against an insurer on a liability
policy, and because uninsured motorist coverage must be in-
6. 302 So. 2d at 713. Defendant's Exhibits D-1 and D-2, Gremillion v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) found in
record lodged with Third Circuit Court of Appeal and available in the
Louisiana State University Law School Library.
7. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960) provides: "As long as the marriage con-
tinues and the spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may
not sue her husband except for: (1) a separation of property; (2) the restitu-
tion and enjoyment of her paraphernal property; (3) a separation from bed
and board; or (4) a divorce."
8. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No.
137 reads: "In the event of payment to any person under the coverage
required by this section .... the insurer making such payment shall, to the
extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment
resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such person against
any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for which
such payment is made .. .
9. See, e.g., Edwards v. Royal Indemn. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
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cluded in a liability policy unless rejected by the insured,"0
the appellate court apparently felt comfortable in relying
upon prior jurisprudence permitting a direct action under
liability coverage by one spouse against the other's insurer.
The present decision thus seems to constitute an extension of
the right of direct action, consistent with prior jurispru-
dence," to a suit by one spouse against the other's insurer
under the uninsured motorist coverage, despite a slight differ-
ence in the wording of the two coverages. 12
But as to the second issue, whether the insurer, once cast
in judgment to the injured spouse, should be permitted to
recover against the uninsured tortfeasor spouse, the court
reached a different result from that reached under the
liability/direct-action-by-spouse jurisprudence. The Gremil-
lion court refused to permit the insurer to recover against the
uninsured tortfeasor spouse, saying that the insurer "does
not have a right to contribution from Mr. Gremillion as a
solidary obligor but only a subrogation right obtained from its
payment to Mrs. Gremillion. State Farm can have no greater
right of action than that of its subrogor, Mrs. Gremillion, and
her right of action is barred by interspousal immunity."'13 The
court distinguished Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Co.,' 4 in which the insurer of a third party
tortfeasor, made defendant by the wife in a suit for damages
arising out of an accident between its insured and her spouse,
was permitted to force contribution by her spouse of one-half
10. See LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1974,
No. 154.
11. See, e.g., Edwards v. Royal Indemn. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191
(1935).
12. The insurer attempted to distinguish between the language used in
the liability portion of the policy ("to pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay") and that of the
uninsured motorist provision ("to pay all sums which the insured or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to recover"). Its argument was that
although prior jurisprudence permitted recovery by one spouse against the
insurer even in the face of an interspousal immunity which would prevent
the tortfeasor-spouse from becoming "legally obligated" to the other, the
difference in language in the uninsured motorist provision should produce a
different result in a direct action under the uninsured motorist clause. The
argument was rejected. Gremillion v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So.
2d 712 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 716.
14. 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
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of her damages. 15 The Gremillion court saw the Smith case as
one of contribution between solidary obligors and the instant
case as one of subrogation.
While it is true that a subrogee has no greater rights
than his subrogor, it is not clear that the question is one of
subrogation. Perhaps the matter is clarified by substituting
an uninsured neighbor for the husband as the driver of the
motorcycle. In such a case, the insurer may certainly proceed
against the neighbor for those sums which it has paid to the
injured wife, though the statute does not mention whether
this is on a theory of subrogation or one of solidarity.16 Now,
placing the husband again in the driver's seat, his claim is
that no such action should lie against him-authority: in-
terspousal immunity. But the statute granting the immunity
mentions only suits between the spouses, not those between
an insurer and a spouse, as the insurers discovered long
ago.1 7 And the same argument was rejected by the court in
Smith, a situation in which the tortfeasor spouse merely
shared the blame for injury with another; in Gremillion the
15. In Smith, plaintiff wife was injured while riding as a passenger in her
husband's vehicle, which was in a collision with another car owned and
driven by one Bordelon and insured by Southern Farm. When Mrs. Smith
sued Southern Farm, it filed a third-party demand against Mr. Smith seeking
one-half of any judgment which it might be condemned to pay to Mrs. Smith.
Mr. Smith argued that this forced him to pay one-half of his wife's damages,
thus indirectly permitting her to sue him and eroding the principle of in-
terspousal immunity. This argument was rejected by the court's decision to
permit contribution. Citing other cases, the court emphasized that the wife
had a substantive cause of action and thus he was an obligor as to her along
with Southern Farm's insured. Southern Farm's right to contribution thus
arose from its status as solidary obligor with the husband. "Therefore, at the
time when the tortious conduct occurred, a legal liability or obligation was
created in the husband, in solido with the other joint-tortfeasor, to repair the
wife's damage caused through their concurring fault." Id. at 705, 174 So. 2d at
126.
16. See LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1972,
No. 137.
17. See LeBlanc v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d 245
(1943) (interspousal immunity personal to dpouses, not available to insurer);
Edwards v. Royal Indemn. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) (same; interest-
ingly, at the time of the accident, the parties involved were engaged and
remained in that status until the suit was filed, and then they married). See
also Snell v. Stein, 261 La. 358, 259 So. 2d 876 (1972) (governmental immunity
of insured not available to insurer in direct action); Lusk v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941) (charitable
immunity of insured not available to insurer in direct action).
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tortfeasor spouse was entirely responsible for the damage
and yet entirely escaped responsibility.18
Arguably the insurer's right to sue in Gremillion might
also arise from its status as a solidary obligor with the
tortfeasor spouse to the injured spouse, and thus the court's
subrogation analogy might not be appropriate. It seems
agreed on all sides that an injured spouse, though without a
right of action against the other spouse because of inter-
spousal immunity, nonetheless has a substantive cause of ac-
tion which is procedurally barred.19 In this case, it would be a
cause of action sounding in tort and making the tortfeasor
spouse the obligor as to the injured spouse. 20
At the same time, and as to the same damage, the insurer
becomes the obligor of the injured spouse in this factual situ-
ation under the uninsured motorist portion of the liability
policy, at least according to this decision. There are then two
obligors-the tortfeasor spouse and the insurer-liable to the
injured spouse for the same damage, at least up to the policy
limits. 2' The fact that one is an obligor in tort and the other in
contract is of no moment; they are at least bound in imperfect
solidarity.22 Being so bound, the payment by one solidary
debtor, the insurer, gives it the independent, substantive and
18. The court in Smith said: "Furthermore, the husband, whose torti-
ous conduct has helped to create the solidary obligation for which his joint
tortfeasor must respond in full to the injured wife, should not be permitted
to escape the consequence of his wrongdoing to parties other than his wife,
such as his clear and apparent statutory obligation to divide the effects of the
solidary debt by contributing to his solidary codebtor." 247 La. 695, 707, 174
So. 2d 122, 126 (1965). It might be argued that an even stronger case is
presented where the tortfeasor spouse is the sole, rather than a contributing
cause, of the other spouse's injury.
19. See id. at 704, 174 So. 2d at 125 and cases cited therein.
20. Id. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2315: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it
21. For an analogous case in which solidarity "up to the policy limits"
permitted a holding of interruption of prescription to that extent by a suit
against the insurer, see Anderson v. Sciambra, 310 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 835 (La. 1975), discussed in text at note 50, infra.
22. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2901: "There is an obligation in solido on the
part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to the same thing, so that each
may be compelled for the whole; and when the payment which is made by one
of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor"; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2092:
"The obligation may be in solido, although one of the debtors be obliged
differently from the other to the payment of one and the same thing; for
instance, if the one be but conditionally bound, whilst the engagement of the
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procedural right to contribution or indemnification, depend-
ing upon the circumstances, from its solidary co-debtor, the
husband.23 The Gremillion case is then not one of subrogation
alone, but of indemnification among solidary debtors. Seen in
this light, the Smith decision is difficult to distinguish from
Gremillion.2
4
The result of Gremillion seems to be that while the wife is
"legally entitled" 25 to recover from her spouse for her dam-
ages, he is not "legally responsible '26 for those same dam-
other is pure and simple, or if the one is allowed a term which is not granted
to the other" (emphasis added). See also Temple v. Harper, 200 So. 2d 749 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967), a case in which the insured sued another driver with
whom he was in a collision and the insured's own insurance company under the
collision coverage. The insurer's defense was that plaintiff insured failed to
notify it timely of the accident. A solidary judgment against the two defen-
dants was rendered in the trial court, and the insurer appealed. The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's holding as to solidarity, noting that the
other driver was obligated in tort to the plaintiff for the damage and the
insurer was obligated in contract to the plaintiff, thus creating imperfect
solidarity up to the amount due by the insurer under the collision coverage.
23. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103; LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1111; Smith v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965). The fact
that indemnification for the total amount paid may be sought by one solidary
obligor against another should not in any way defeat a finding of solidarity.
It should be remembered that the uninsured motorist and the insurer are not
joint tortfeasors and for that reason solidarily liable to the injured spouse;
they are solidary obligors for the reason that they are both bound to the
same obligee for the same damage. The Civil Code expressly envisions indem-
nification as a possible relationship between solidary obligors in art. 2106:
"If the affair for which the debt has been contracted in solido, concern only
one of the co-obligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole debt towards
the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his
securities." But see Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973), and the
comments in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231 (1974) and in Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 648
(1974).
24. See also Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972), in which
the supreme court, citing Smith, extended its rationale to a contribution
action sought by the insurer of a driver involved in an accident with Mrs.
Walker and her children. Upon a finding that Mrs. Walker was also negligent,
the court permitted the insurer to receive contribution from her for her
children's injuries caused by her and by its insured. It thus rejected the same
argument as to child-parent immunity that had been rejected as to inter-
spousal immunity in Smith, and overruled the earlier case of Johnson v. Hous-
ing Authority, 163 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). It is interesting that the
author of the Walker opinion is Chief Justice Sanders, who had dissented in
the Smith decision.
25. This is the language of the uninsured motorist clause of the policy.
26. This is the language of the uninsured motorist coverage statute, LA.
R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 154.
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ages. This is certainly not logical and may not even be desir-
able. But certainly it is a matter of determining the policy
behind the uninsured motorist statute and enforcing it. If the
policy is to be that the insurer is to bear the kind of risk it did
in Gremillion, then it would be better to reach that result
directly and consistently, perhaps by overruling the jurispru-
dence which excludes motorcycles from the definition of non-
owned automobiles under liability coverage. 27 And if the pol-
icy is to the contrary, then the result in Smith is commended
to the court, based upon the existence of imperfect solidarity
between the tortfeasor spouse and the insurer.
There are a number of points to criticize about the Gre-
million decision: it may well be inconsistent with the purpose
of uninsured motorist coverage; 28 it seems inconsistent with
prior Louisiana jurisprudence on very similar issues, such as
Smith29 and Walker v. Milton;3 0 it is contrary to the decision
reached by apparently the only other court which has consid-
ered a similar issue;3 1 and it seems to treat insurers by one
27. Guillory v. Deshotel, 251 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 259
La. 810, 253 So. 2d 67 (1971); Labove v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 219 So. 2d
614 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 La. 22, 222 So. 2d 69 (1969).
28. That purpose is usually said to be "to give the same protection to a
person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have if he had been
injured in an accident caused by an automobile covered by a standard liabil-
ity insurance policy." 12 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 45:623 at 570 (1964). See
also 7 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICES 3d § 274.1 at 43-44
(1966) and Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Louisiana, 32 LA. L.
REV. 431 (1972). Its purpose is not to provide "insurance or indemnification
for the uninsured motorist, and the insurer does not stand in the shoes of the
uninsured motorist who is the tortfeasor." Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
253 La. 521, 528, 218 So. 2d 580, 583 (1968). It is the clear policy of the statute
and the coverage that, where financially feasible, the loss be borne by the
tortfeasor, who is the uninsured motorist. See LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp.
1958), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 154. Consistent with this policy,
insurers theoretically construct their premium schedules on the assumption
that the uninsured motorist will at least be amenable to suit, although
sometimes judgment proof.
29. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d
122 (1965).
30. 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972).
31. Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 413 S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Ct. of App., Mo.
1967). Wife was a passenger in a lead vehicle and was injured when an
uninsured vehicle driven by her husband ran into the back of the lead
vehicle. The wife sued the insurer of the lead driver under its uninsured
motorist coverage, but the court determined that there was no coverage,
since the company only agreed to pay if the uninsured motorist was "legally
responsible" for the tort. Since the wife could not sue the husband in Mis-
souri, he was not legally responsible for the tort, and she was not covered
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standard and individuals by another.32 But the purpose of
this over-lengthy discussion has been to spotlight the now-
you-see-it, now-you-don't quality of imperfect solidarity dem-
onstrated by the opinion.33 This was an opportunity to put
the doctrine to good use to avoid the inequitable result
reached by the court, which regarded subrogation as the only
possible legal theory on which recovery by the insurer could
be based.
Interruption of Prescription as to Solidary Obligors
A triad of notable cases decided during the last term dealt
with the interruption of prescription as to solidary obligors.
Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.34 was another stage
in lengthy litigation arising out of the deaths of certain per-
sons in a salt mine accident in 1970. Initially, a widow filed
suit on behalf of herself and her children against six named
executive officers of the company which owned the salt mine,
and their insurers, Liberty Mutual and Insurance Company
of North America (INA). At trial, a jury verdict was returned
absolving all the defendants of liability;35 the judgment en-
tered on that verdict was affirmed by the appellate court,36
and the supreme court denied writs.37 Within a year of that
final judgment, but well over a year after the accident, the
widow filed another suit against the same insurers, asserting
their liability to her because of the alleged negligence of yet
another executive officer, arguably insured by them but not
named in the first suit. The insurers filed a peremptory ex-
ception of prescription which was sustained by the trial
court.38 That decision was reversed by the appellate court,
under the uninsured motorist clause. The court thus decided the issue at an
earlier stage, eliminating the need of a discussion of any contribution rights.
32. This was noted by Judge Miller in his dissent in Gremillion v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 712, 717 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
33. For a general discussion of the concept, see The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 280, 291
(1974).
34. 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975). A companion case was decided the same day,
Nunez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 356 (La. 1975).
35. 314 So. 2d at 351.
36. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
37. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 275 So. 2d 791 (La. 1973).
38. The trial court thus did not reach a second peremptory exception filed
by the insurers based upon a claim of res judicata. The appellate court,
reversing the trial court's decision on the prescription issue, did reach the res
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which remanded the case for trial.3 9 At the request of the
insurers, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs.
The single issue facing the court was whether the first
suit had interrupted prescription, which would otherwise
clearly bar the second suit. Plaintiff argued, under Louisiana
R.S. 9:5801,40 that all prescriptions affecting the cause of ac-
tion were interrupted as to all defendants by the commence-
ment of the action in a court of competent jurisdiction and in
the proper venue, since the cause of action in the first and
second suits was identical. The supreme court rejected the
argument on the basis that the second suit, having the negli-
gence of yet another executive officer as its ground of com-
plaint, was not the same cause of action.4 1
The court of appeal had rested its decision that prescrip-
tion had been interrupted, however, principally upon Civil
Code article 2097.42 It believed that the two insurers were
solidarily liable with regard to the plaintiff, and therefore the
first suit against Liberty interrupted prescription against
INA, and vice versa.43 The supreme court properly disagreed,
noting that the two insurers were not solidarily liable with
judicata claim and also found no merit in that exception. Trahan v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d 606, 610-11 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
39. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
40. "All prescriptions affecting the cause of action therein sued upon are
interrupted as to all defendants, including minors or interdicts, by the com-
mencement of a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction and in the
proper venue.. . ." LA. R.S. 9:5801 (Supp. 1960). It has been held that the
phrase "all defendants" used in the statute means only those defendants
named in the petition, and thus, the statute has no application to him. See
Majesty v. Comet-Mercury-Ford Co., 296 So. 2d 271 (La. 1974); Jacobs v.
Harmon, 197 So. 2d 704, 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). This would have avoided
dealing with the thorny issue of right of action versus cause of action. See
also Anderson v. Sciambra, 310 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 313
So. 2d 835 (1975).
41. Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350 (La. 1975). "A cause of
action in tort has no identity independent from the defendant upon whose
fault it is based." Id. at 353.
42. "A suit brought against one of the debtors in solido interrupts pre-
scription with regard to all."
43. See Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d at 610: "Although this
article has been cited, counsel may have overlooked the fact that both Lib-
erty Mutual and INA were sued in the first suits, and that they are now sued
as solidary obligors. Thus the first suits against Liberty Mutual interrupted
prescription as to the instant suits against INA, and, likewise, the first suits
against INA interrupted prescription in the present suits against Liberty
Mutual, the interruption taking place because they are alleged 'debtors in
solido' as the article provides."
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regard to plaintiff; only the joint tortfeasors, if any, would be
solidarily liable to plaintiff. The additional fact that a
tortfeasor and his insurer are liable in solido to the victim 44
did not produce the final leg of the triangle: solidarity be-
tween the insurers as to the victim. 45 Since the six executive
officers sued in the first suit were absolved of any liability
and thus were not obligated to plaintiff in any way-solidarily
or otherwise4 -this meant that they could not be bound in
solido with the additional executive officer upon whose al-
leged negligence the second suit was based. And without an
interruption as to that additional executive officer, there was
no interruption as to his insurers.47
In the Trahan case, the court distinguished the second of
this series of three cases, Simmons v. Travelers Insurance
Co. 48 In that case, suit was timely filed against four executive
officers and a liability insurer. Some time later, more than a
year after the accident in question, a supplemental and
amending petition was filed, naming a fifth executive officer
and alleging coverage by the same liability insurer. That
officer interposed a plea of prescription as to his personal
liability, which plea was rejected by the trial court and that
decision was affirmed by the appellate court. The appellate
court, citing a recent supreme court decision,4 9 took the view
that the fifth officer and the insurer were or could be solidar-
ily liable to the plaintiff, and thus the initiation of the suit
44. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1962, No. 471 § 1.
45. This is not the first time that a similar holding has appeared. In the
analogous case of Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), it was
held that the fathers of two minor tortfeasors were solidarily liable, as be-
tween themselves, to the victim. See comments on that decision in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1978 Term-Obligations, 34 LA.
L. REV. 231 (1974).
46. This solution was suggested in a similar situation. See The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-197s Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L.
REV. 231, 231-32 n.7 (1974) [commenting on Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d
303 (La. 1973)].
47. "IT]here must be a solidary obligation to plaintiff of one or more of
the six named executive officers (and, as a consequence, their insurers) and
[the seventh officer] .... The judgment in the first suit absolving the six
named executive officers (and, as a result, their insurer) means that those
executive officers (and their insurers, in that capacity) cannot be solidary
debtors with [the seventh officer] (and accordingly his insurers in that capac-
ity) as they are not liable to plaintiff on the claim asserted in the first suit."
Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350, 356 (La. 1975).
48. 295 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
49. Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 281 So. 2d 724 (La. 1973).
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against the insurer had interrupted prescription as to the
officer.
The Trahan court's basis of distinction was twofold: (1)
plaintiffs original petition in Simmons had named the in-
surer as a defendant "as general liability insurer of all the
executive officers" of the corporation which employed the in-
jured plaintiff,50 whereas in Trahan the original petition named
Liberty Mutual and INA as insurers only of the six named
executive officers; and (2) the joinder of the additional execu-
tive officer in Simmons had occurred prior to trial, whereas in
Trahan the second suit followed a first trial which had ab-
solved all six of the individual defendants in the first suit of
liability.
The third decision was Anderson v. Sciambra,51 in which
plaintiff, injured in a fall from a rear porch at his apartment,
timely sued the man he knew as his landlord and that man's
insurer. Thereafter, at a point in time more than a year after
the injury occurred, those defendants disclosed that the
leased premises had been donated to the man's daughter by
an act recorded almost a year before the injury. Plaintiff
amended to name the daughter as a defendant, and she
promptly pleaded prescription, since the amendment came
over a year after the injury. The trial court sustained her
exception and also dismissed the suit against her father and
the insurer on the basis of nonliability. The appellate court,
however, reversed as to the insurer 52 and, to the extent of the
insurer's policy limits on liability coverage, as to the daugh-
ter. Its reasoning was that the daughter and the insurer
were, up to the policy limits, solidarily bound to the plaintiff,
50. The language is the court's in Trahan, 314 So. 2d at 355, and is
apparently based upon Paragraph 10 of plaintiff's original petition, which,
following an allegation that the insurer was the liability insurer of the four
named executive officers, read as follows: "Further, plaintiff alleges on in-
formation and belief that Travelers Insurance Company had a general liabil-
ity insurance policy and/or workmen's compensation insurance policy in favor
of Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. and its executive officers, directors, stock-
holders, engineers, supervisory personnel and employees." Record lodged oh
appeal to the third circuit at R-31, available in Louisiana State University
Law Library. The petition does not contain the word "all."
51. 310 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 835 (La.
1975).
52. The policy still named the parents as insureds, but the court said that
the naming of the parents as the insureds was a mutual mistake in light of the
donation which had occurred, and treated the policy "as reformed to name
the daughter as the insured." 310 So. 2d at 131.
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and that the suit against the insurer interrupted prescription
as to the daughter to the extent of those policy limits. 53
Where do these decisions lead? They certainly lead to the
conclusion that even greater care must be exercised in the
drafting of pleadings. What would have happened, for exam-
ple, if the plaintiff in Trahan had alleged that Liberty Mutual
and INA were the insurers of all executive officers of the
corporation, rather than specifying that they were insurers of
only the six named individuals? Would this not have made the
case like Simmons, and for that matter like Anderson and
Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,54 situations in
which prescription is interrupted because the insurer of a
solidary obligor is sued before prescription, and the obligor
himself after? Is it a sufficient ground of distinction that the
first suit is over? If so, can one then initiate a new suit while
the first one is on appeal and not yet final? Could one then
simply sue an insurer, alleging coverage as to all possible
parties, and then pick through the individuals, perhaps in
successive trials, until the right one is found? The indication
that a slight change in the pleadings in Trahan to allege that
the two insurers were the insurers of all executive officers of
the company might have permitted plaintiff to survive the
plea of prescription and proceed with a second suit against
the seventh executive officer after she lost against the origi-
nal six raises this possibility.
These decisions also lead to the conclusion that a timely
suit against an "answerable" defendant, financially respon-
sive for the acts of a tortfeasor, will interrupt prescription as
to that tortfeasor 55 even though he might not himself be sued
until well after the prescriptive period has expired. This is no
doubt consistent with the philosophy of direct action, but it
may well work considerable hardship upon the "answerable"
defendant if a long delay intervenes before the "right"
tortfeasor is found or if multiple suits are permitted. It would
appear the direct action statute ought to work both ways:
53. This was essentially the same decision as that reached by the su-
preme court in Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 281 So. 2d 724
(La. 1973).
54. 281 So. 2d 724 (La. 1973).
55. This is the converse of a suggestion made in The Work of the Louisi-
ana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1978 Term--)bligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231,
236 (1974), that at least it should be provided that a suit against the "prim-
ary" defendant (the tortfeasor) will interrupt prescription as to any "answer-
able" defendant.
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once the insurer has gone to trial and been absolved of liabil-
ity, some legal principle-whether it be res judicata, prescrip-
tion, some form of estoppel or some other principle-ought to
put the matter at an end.56
COMPROMISE AND RELEASE
The strong jurisprudential principle favoring compromise
and settlement of cases 57 may have suffered some erosion in
two cases decided during the last term. The first of these,
Schiffman v. Service Truck Lines, Inc.,58 appeared to be a
matter of first impression. Husband was injured by defen-
dant's employee, and lay in a coma for more than four years
before he died. Wife was appointed curatrix of her husband,
and during his comatose period, she executed in that capacity
a "receipt and release," acknowledging receipt of $75,000 on
her husband's behalf. That instrument also recited that the
wife
joins in her individual capacity the Release executed by
her as Curatrix . . . hereby releasing, remitting and
forever discharging [defendants] from all claims.., which
.. Appearer has had, now has or may in the future have,
in the event [the husband] should die, to recover for his
conscious pain and suffering through the date of his
death, all expenses incurred therefrom . . . and for her
own individual losses and claims which may arise from his
death.59
56. See Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972), a case in which it
was quite clear that plaintiff ought not to be permitted to sue a second time
on the same facts on which he lost the first time, and sympathize with the
court's difficulty in finding an appropridte justification for that outcome.
57. E.g,, Jackson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 419
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
58. 308 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 826 (court's emphasis). Is this instrument different from one
such as that in Johnson v. Sundbery, 150 So. 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933), in
which the victim "settled" all claims, and later died? In that case, the court
held that the compromise could not affect the wrongful death action of the
victim's beneficiaries under LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315, since their rights arose
only on her death and thus were unable to be "compromised" by her. If the
wife in Schiffman was acting as curatrix in effect giving legal capacity to the
victim, would it have been sufficient to cite Johnson v. Sundbery and declare
that the wife could not have settled the wrongful death claim at the same
time? Resolution of the issue would seem to turn on the wording of the
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About six months after the instrument was executed, the
husband died, and the wife individually and on behalf of her
four children brought a wrongful death action. 60 Defendants
interposed a peremptory exception of res judicata based upon
the release, and the trial court sustained the exception. The
appellate court, however, with one dissent,61 reversed the
trial court and overruled the exception.
The appellate court rejected the wife's argument that the
instrument was not explicit enough to conclude that she in-
tended to settle62 the wrongful death claim, and this seems
clearly correct. But the court then held the instrument was
invalid "as against the public policy prohibiting dealing in or
renunciation of rights whose coming into existence requires
the death of a living person. '63 As authority for that "public
policy" the court cited three articles of the Civil Code having
to do with acceptance, renunciation or sale of the succession
of a living person.64 These articles do not mention wrongful
death actions, but the court correctly notes that the action
release, which appears to involve more than just the victim's claim, compro-
mised through the curatrix.
60. No mention was made in the instrument of the rights of the four
children arising upon the husband's death, and thus no issue was presented
to the court as to their rights.
61. Since the decision of the trial court was reversed, but with dissent,
under the new constitution, it would have been necessary to re-argue the
case before a panel of five appellate judges. LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(B) reads:
"A majority of the judges sitting in a case must concur to render judgment.
However, when a judgment of a district court is to be modified or reversed
and one judge dissents, the case shall be reargued before a panel of at least
five judges prior to rendition of judgment, and a majority must concur to
render judgment." Since the decision in this case was rendered December 30,
1974, and the constitution became effective at midnight on December 31, 1974,
this section presumably did not apply. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 23.
62. The court classified the instrument as an onerous remission rather
than a compromise since the wife did not receive any payment individually.
See Schiffman v. Service Mech. Lines, Inc., 308 So. 2d 824, 826 n.1 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
63. 308 So. 2d at 826.
64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 984: "The acceptance or rejection made by the
heir, before the succession is opened or left, is absolutely null and can pro-
duce no effect; but this does not prevent the heir who has thus accepted, from
accepting or rejecting validly the succession when his right is complete." LA.
Civ. CODE art. 1887: "Future things may be the object of an obligation. One
cannot, however, renounce the succession of an estate not yet devolved, nor
can any stipulation be made with regard to such a succession, even with the
consent of him whose succession is in question." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2454:
"The succession of a living person cannot be sold."
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was not recognized when the articles were written. Then the
court concludes that "contracting in future rights whose com-
ing into existence requires a living person to die is no more
acceptable in wrongful death cases than in succession cases
.... Dealing in such rights is contrary to morals, moral conduct
and public order . . .and therefore ineffective. ' 6 5
The court's opinion makes a substantial leap in going
from articles dealing specifically with successions to a deci-
sion on the compromise of a wrongful death claim. The
reasons for the articles prohibiting acceptance, renunciation
or sale of the succession of a living person are only in part
based on morality and, even then, there is no reason to think
they should be expanded beyond their own terms. Certainly
both Roman 66 and French law6 7 acknowledged that dealing in
a future succession might produce some danger to the living
65. Schiffman v. Service Truck Lines, Inc., 308 So. 2d 824, 827 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
66. The Romans apparently were not quite as rigorous as the French and
the Louisianians. Agreements concerning future succession rights were per-
mitted by the Romans with the consent of the person whose succession was
to be the object of the rights. See 16 F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL
FRAN(AIS no 84 (2d ed. 1876).
67. See 16 F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(CAIS no 83 (2d ed.
1876): "The place which Article 1130 [LA. CIV. CODE art. 1887] occupies seems
to imply that the lawmaker prohibited agreements on future succession be-
cause they had for their object something which did not exist and might
never exist. It is true that there is no such thing as the succession of a living
person, but future things also do not exist, and yet they can become the
object of conventions. There must then have been a particular reason for
which the lawmaker prohibited all conventions on a future succession, even
in the most favored of contracts, the marriage contract. Bigot-Pr~ameneu
says, in the exposa des motifs, that such conventions are disapproved because
they are contrary to public honesty. This is the expression of Pothier, who
says: 'There are some things which it is contrary to decency and good morals
to hope for, such as a future succession since one can only hope for it by
hoping for the death of the person whose succession will be opened thereby;
and this is something that good morals does not permit.' A guilty desire
might give rise to criminal thoughts. Les pactes successiores are thus con-
trary to good morals and public order" (author's translation). See also 7 T.
Huc, COMMENTAIRE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL no 72 (1894) and
Juris-Classeur Civil Art. 1600 at 2: "Article 1600 [LA. CIV. CODE art. 2484], in
forbidding the sale of the succession of a living person, is just one application
of a general principle of our law as to this kind of contract. But it is evident
that only future successions are covered by this prohibition; all other future
things may be the object of a contract by virtue of Article 1130 [LA. CIV. CODE
art. 1887], first paragraph, and are susceptible of being sold" (author's trans-
lation).
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person, since one could only entertain thoughts about or
rights in that succession while thinking at the same time of
the death of the living person. But there were surely other
reasons as well, at least in the sale of a future succession,
such as the fact that the rights of the "heir" were speculative
and might never in fact come into existence, thus making
protection of the vendee an additional reason for the prohibi-
tion.
The same considerations do not appear to be true of the
wrongful death action. First, there is no "vendee" in the
normal sense of that word, and there is no reason to protect
the compromising tortfeasor in the future. Second, the con-
tract in question is one of settlement and release. Neither in
its confection nor subsequent to it is the death of the victim
material. Neither party would have any reason to seek the
death of the victim, which is the "moral" problem with the
sale of the succession of a living person. Certainly the defen-
dants would gain nothing by his death; theoretically they
have already paid the damages to be suffered by that event.
And certainly the wife gains nothing by his death-unless it
be the right to ignore the terms of a settlement such as this
one and bring suit. If that is the case, the court's decision to
void the settlement ironically might foster those "immoral"
thoughts that it wants to avoid.
Even if the court is correct in its view of the premature
settlement of a wrongful death claim, its statement of the
"public policy" might be too broad. Is not term life insurance
''contracting in future rights whose coming into existence
requires a living person to die"? Could it then be said that
term life insurance is against "public policy"?
Certainly, as the court notes in its opinion, the matter "is
far from free of doubt."6 8 But in light of the fact that the Civil
Code specifically provides that "future things may be the
object of an obligation" 69 and excepts from that only the suc-
cession of a living person, and taking into account the strong
principle favoring compromise and settlement of lawsuits, it
might have been preferable to resolve the doubt in the oppo-
site direction.
The second case 70 dealing with compromise and settle-
68. Schiffman v. Service Truck Lines, Inc., 308 So. 2d 824, 827 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
69. See text of LA. CIV. CODE arts. 984, 1887, 2454 at note 64, supra.
70. Berger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974).
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ment arose out of the death of a seven-year-old girl after she
allegedly sustained a puncture injury in a school yard acci-
dent when struck by a piece of wire thrown up by a lawn
mower. She was rushed to a hospital, underwent surgery, but
died the next day. Her parents filed suit timely, but having
executed a compromise with the school board, 71 named only
the surgeons, the hospital and the hospital's insurer 72 as de-
fendants.
The central issue was the wording of the compromise,
which, after reciting that the parents asserted a claim
against the school board and that the school board denied
liability but each wanted to settle the controversy, reflected
receipt of some $42,730 for which
appearers, for themselves, their heirs and assigns do
hereby expressly release and forever discharge the Jef-
ferson Parish School Board, and all other persons from
any and all claims or damages arising out of or in any
way connected with the death, injury, damages, loss of
love and affection, medical expenses and funeral expenses
of the said minor daughter . . . and any and all injury,
costs, damages or expenses received or sustained by ap-
pearers as the result thereof .... 73
During a discovery deposition prior to the filing of suit,
this compromise came to light, and, based upon it, the sur-
geons filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
granted by the trial court. The parents appealed, contending
that two separate causes of action were present, one against
the school board for the initial injury and one against the
surgeons for subsequent medical malpractice in treating the
injury. They alleged that only the former had been com-
promised, despite the broad language of the release.74 To this
71. The injury in the school yard occurred on March 28, 1972; the victim
died on March 29, 1972; the compromise was executed on July 18, 1972; and
suit was filed March 28, 1973.
72. Following the revelation of the compromise, the hospital and its in-
surer filed an exception of res judicata which was sustained, and that deci-
sion was not appealed.
73. Berger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 724, 726 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974). The release continues: "at or about the time and place stated
above, or at any other time or place, irrespective of how the same may have
arisen, or under what laws; and appearers hereby acknowledge for them-
selves, their heirs and assigns, full and final satisfaction thereof and
therefor."
74. Plaintiffs-appellants' brief pointed to the other portions of the release
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the surgeons countered that the language of the release in
favor of "all other persons" was unambiguous and thus
served to release them. And further, they argued, since an
original tortfeasor, the school board in this case, is liable in
solido with a negligent physician for additional injury caused
to the victim by that negligence, 75 and no rights were re-
served against them in the release of one solidary obligor,
they were released by virtue of the tenents of Louisiana Civil
Code article 2203.76
The thrust of the court's decision on appeal was that a
motion for summary judgment was not an appropriate vehicle
to dispose of the case in its present status. The court noted
first that an issue of fact existed surrounding the intentions
of the plaintiffs in entering the disputed compromise agree-
ment. Then it noted that the surgeons' argument based upon
solidarity depended not upon a holding that the school board
and the surgeons were joint tortfeasors, 77 but rather upon a
holding that each was a tortfeasor, and as to the injury suf-
fered subsequent to the school yard incident, each might be
liable to plaintiffs. This depended upon proof that the school
board's employee was negligent in the operation of the mow-
er, a point neither alleged nor proven.7 8 Since this holding
which were specific in limiting plaintiffs' claim to the school board, in noting
the school board's denial of the claim, and in stating that it was the desire of
plaintiffs and the school board to settle the controversy. There was no refer-
ence in these portions to "all other persons." Plaintiffs-Appellants Original
Brief, Berger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974) at 2, to be found in duplicate of appellate record in Louisiana State
University Law Library.
75. The surgeons cited Hillebrandt v. Holsum Bakeries, Inc., 267 So. 2d
608 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), Thibodaux v. Potomac Insurance Co., 201 So. 2d
159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), and Hudgens v. Mayeaux, 143 So. 2d 606 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962), for this proposition.
76. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2203: "The remission or conventional discharge in
favor of one of the codebtors in solido, discharges all the others, unless the
creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter. In the latter
case, he cannot claim the debt without making a deduction of the part of him
to whom he has made the remission."
77. It did not appear to the court that, in the terms of LA. Civ. CODE art.
2324, the surgeons had "caused" the school board "to do an unlawful act" or
that they had assisted or encouraged in the commission of it.
78. The school board was not named as a defendant, and the original
petition limited itself to a recitation that the child "sustained a puncture
injury as a result of a school yard accident, wherein a piece of wire was
thrown by a lawnmower." Plaintiffs' Original Petition, Berger v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. at R.2, appellate record to be found in Louisiana State Univer-
sity Law School Library.
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would produce solidarity as to the subsequent damage and
would be necessary to establish the surgeons' affirmative de-
fense of release because there was no reservation of rights in
the compromise agreement, the burden of proving that the
school board's employee was negligent apparently would lie
with the surgeons, an unusual situation to say the least.
Plaintiffs on remand obviously would have to dem-
onstrate that the subsequent injury constituted a totally
different tort, for which the original tortfeasor would not
have been responsible in any event.79 This would defeat any
possibility of solidarity as to the subsequent damage, and
thus eliminate the surgeons' argument that they were re-
leased as solidary obligors because there was no reservation
of rights against them. The case would then turn upon the
meaning of the phrase "and all other persons" in the com-
promise itself.80
The decision seems correct in view of the fact that the
court had the case before it on appeal from a successful mo-
tion for summary judgment, and there were genuine issues of
material fact to be resolved. But it stands as a strong remin-
der that an instrument of compromise and release must be
carefully drawn, lest one or both sides regret that it was
effected.
ILLEGAL CAUSE
Several cases decided during the last term involve the
issue of illegal cause of obligations. The first of these,
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti,51 involving non-competition
clauses in employment contracts, appears to resolve a dispute
of long standing between the courts of appeal. Since this is a
79. This was discussed by Judge Gulotta in his concurring opinion. He
noted that the cases cited by the majority (and the surgeons), supra, note 75,
all involved negligent medical treatment which was connected to the original
tort or aggravated it or flowed directly from it, while the present case might
be one of a remote, unconnected, intervening act, independent of the original
tort. In any event, because this presented a factual question, he concurred in
the remand.
80. The surgeons asserted in their appellate brief that "what obviously
happened is that after entering into the release, the plaintiffs changed their
minds and decided that it would be an attractive proposition for them to
attempt to get some more money from the surgeons." Defendants-Appellees'
Original Brief, Berger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 724 at 5, to be
found in duplicate appellate record in Louisiana State University Law School
Library.
81. 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974).
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matter which has provoked considerable doctrinal commen-
tary, some of it recent, 82 only a brief mention of the decision
need be made.
For a considerable period of time, the legality of agree-
ments exacted by employers from their employees not to
compete with them after the termination of an employment
relationship was solely a jurisprudential matter, since there
was no statute on the question. In 1934, however, Louisiana
Act 133 declared it to be the "public policy" of Louisiana that
employers should not require or direct their employees to
enter contracts with non-competition clauses, thus effectively
preventing employers from restraining their employees from
entering competing businesses for themselves or for others
after leaving the employer's business. The substance of this
act became section 921 of Title 23 in the Revised Statutes of
1950 and remained unchanged until Act 104 of 1962 added a
proviso to the basic prohibition against non-competition
clauses to permit a limited8 3 version of such clauses when the
employer has incurred "an expense in the training of the
employee" or "an expense in the advertisement of the busi-
ness that the employer is engaged in .... ,,84
The vagueness of the words "an expense" in the proviso
produced a series of inconsistent decisions by the various
courts of appeal. Generally speaking, decisions of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal seemed to require the employer, to
enforce a non-competition clause, to show some substantial
training or advertising expense which singled out the
employee from his fellows or in the public eye,8 5 while the
82. Comment, Agreements Not to Compete, 33 LA. L. REV. 94 (1972);
Comment, Obligations-Agreements in Restraint of Competition, 11 LA. L.
REV. 383 (1951); Note, 27 TuL. L. REV. 364 (1953).
83. Under the proviso, the employee is permitted to bind himself not to
enter into the same business as that of the employer, "over the same route or
in the same territory for a period of two years." LA. R.S. 23:921 (Supp. 1962).
84. In full, the proviso to the basic prohibition reads as follows: "provided
that in those cases where the employer incurs an expense in the training of
the employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business that
the employer is engaged in, then in that event it shall be permissible for the
employer and employee to enter into a voluntary contract and agreement
whereby the employee is permitted to agree and bind himself that at the
termination of his or her employment that said employee will not enter into
the same business in which employer is engaged over the same route or in
the same territory for a period of two years."
85. The leading case in this line is National Motor Club of Louisiana, Inc.
v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. 4enied, 247 La. 875, 175 So. 2d
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decisions of the other circuits were normally more lenient in
permitting the employer to support a limited non-competition
clause by showing ordinary administrative costs incurred in
training or advertising.86
Support for the more stringent view of the statute had
previously been urged ,8 7 and the supreme court took this po-
sition in the Foti case. The employee had been with the com-
pany about five years, having been transferred to various
offices within the state as a managerial-level employee. He
had apparently signed several employment contracts over
these years, but only the last of these was at issue in the
litigation. In that last contract, the employee agreed not to
engage in the pest control business, for two years after his
employment terminated, in the cities of Alexandria, Crowley,
Monroe, Lafayette, Lake Charles, Natchitoches, New Iberia,
Shreveport or Ruston, or anywhere within a radius of fifty
miles of each. It could be argued that the breadth of this
prohibition might in itself have voided the agreement since
the statute limits such clauses to engaging in the employer's
business "over the same route or in the same territory," a
phrase which would not appear to permit inclusion of virtu-
ally the entire state as does this prohibition.
However, the court did not choose to invalidate the non-
competition clause on that basis, but rather met squarely the
issue of what expenses the employer must demonstrate to
110 (1965). It was followed by Weight Watchers of Louisiana v. Ryals, 289 So.
2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), a decision in which the First Circuit Court of
Appeal apparently abandoned its own position lenient to the employer and
joined the third circuit's rationale. Accordingly, Ryals was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 302 So. 2d 598 (1974), on the same day that the
court decided the Foti case. Another case in the Conque line was Peltier v.
Hebert, 245 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
86. The leading case in this line is Aetna Finance Co. v. Adams, 170 So. 2d
740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 489, 172 So. 2d 294 (1965). The
Adams decision was followed by the second circuit in World Wide Health
Studies, Inc. v. Desmond, 222 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969) and by the
fourth circuit in National School Studies, Inc. v. Barrios, 236 So. 2d 309 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1970). It was even apparently followed by the third circuit, the
originator of the Conque line, in Louisiana Office Systems, Inc. v. Boudreaux,
298 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). However, writs were granted in Boud-
reaux and the decision was reversed and remanded for further proceedings in
the light of the Foti decision, 302 So. 2d 37 (La. 1974). On remand, the court
not having received a brief from either party and the matter being appar-
ently moot, the appeal was dismissed. 309 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
87. See Comment, Agreements Not to Compete, 33 LA. L. REV. 94, 109
(1972).
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support such a clause. Plaintiff employer had sought an in-
junction enforcing the non-competition clause when the
employee quit and went into the pest control business for
himself in Opelousas. The employer was granted an injunc-
tion by the trial court, but only as to those parts of the
employment agreement which prohibited the employee from
soliciting business from customers of the employer formerly
serviced by him as an employee.
The employer appealed, seeking enforcement of the gen-
eral non-competition clause as well. The appellate court
affirmed, with one dissent.s 8 The supreme court's decision to
affirm the appellate court appears to be based on its view that
the statute expresses a strong public policy against non-
competition clauses and that the consequent heavy burden on
the employer to satisfy its conditions for enforcement of such
a clause Was not met by Orkin. The court took note that the
employer's only evidence on the "expense" issue was the ex-
penditure of some $260 for a, manager training school at-
tended three years earlier and the employee's attendance at
three or four one-day service training schools. The court
found these expenses insufficient to satisfy the requirement
of specialized training expenses.
There is no question that the court's decision in Foti
constitutes a gloss on the wording of Louisiana R.S. 23:921,
since that statute merely refers to "an expense" in training
or "an expense" in advertising. The gloss is justified by the
court on the ground that the policy of the statute, even as
amended, disfavors non-competition clauses. It might also be
said that the proviso permitting limited non-competition
clauses is an exception to the general rule, and should be
narrowly construed to prevent erosion of the statute's princi-
pal intendment. In any case, the conflict apparently is settled,
at least for the moment; hence, an employer who seeks to
enforce a limited non-competition clause had best be prepared
to prove that he has invested substantial sums in special
88. 287 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). Judge Miller dissented on the
ground that the majority had minimized the employer's expenses in training
the employee. He pointed out that the employee knew nothing about the
business when he started, but after four years with the employer, managed
to pass the "difficult" state licensing test. Five months later, he quit the
company. Judge Miller concluded that "the facts of this case present a classic
case for enforcement" of the statute. Id. at 576.
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training of the employee or in advertising the employee's
connection with his business.8 9
Another case in which the court voided an agreement as
having an illegal cause was Aucoin v. Williams." Plaintiff, an
attorney, was employed by defendant to defend her in a di-
vorce action filed by her husband and to assert her rights to
the community property, especially a share in whatever pro-
ceeds might be derived from a pending tort action to recover
damages for an injury which the husband incurred during the
marriage. Their oral fee agreement was described by plaintiff
as including a "contingent" fee, "based upon one-third of all
amounts recovered, if any." 91 Eventually a judgment of di-
vorce was rendered, recognizing each spouse as the owner of
a one-half interest in the pending cause of action. Still later
the tort action was compromised for $175,000. The original
divorce suit was apparently compromised 92 before it was
heard in the supreme court, although that court had granted
writs to hear the case.9 3 Plaintiff then filed the present action,
claiming that, based upon the rationale of Chambers v. Cham-
bers,9 4 his client was entitled to one-half of the $175,000, and
he in turn was entitled to one-third of the amount she re-
ceived, or a total fee of some $29,000.
89. The language is that of the Conque court at 173 So. 2d 241 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So. 2d 110 (1965), repeated by the Foti
court at 302 So. 2d 597 (La. 1974). In further explaining the requirement, the
Foti court adds: "If an employer extensively advertises a particular
employee as the man to go to for the employer's type of services, it is not
unfair to protect the employer's investment in this particularized asset by
authorizing a limited non-competition agreement to prevent the advertised
employee from misusing it. If an employer spends a substantial sum afford-
ing special training to an employee, it may not be unfair to protect the
employer by authorizing a limited non-competition agreement to prevent the
employee from using this specialized training for the benefit of another in -
competition with his former employer." Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302
So. 2d 593, 597 (La. 1974).
90. 295 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 798 (La. 1974):
"Writ denied. We cannot say that the judgment is incorrect." Mr. Justice
Dixon dissented from the refusal to grant writs on the ground that the case
could be distinguished from Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La.
1974), on which the appellate court relied.
91. Aucoin v. Williams, 295 So. 2d 868, 869 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
92. See Chambers v. Chambers, 259 La. 246, 272, 249 So. 2d 896, 905 (1971)
(Tate, J., dissenting).
93. Alfred v. Alfred, 256 La. 847, 239 So. 2d 356 (1970).
94. 259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In defending against his claim, the wife raised several
issues not reached by the court,95 which chose to base its
decision on the fact that the fee in question was contingent
upon dissolution of the marriage, and that such a contract
was in derogation of the marriage relation and against public
policy. In doing so, the appellate court closely followed and
quoted at length from Succession of Butler,96 a similar case
decided recently by the supreme court and excellently dis-
cussed in a portion of last year's symposium by a colleague.9 7
In Butler, attorneys employed to file a suit for separation
from bed and board for a contingent fee of 10% of any assets
recovered from the community attempted to enforce the con-
tract against the succession of the husband, who had died
during the pendency of the separation action. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, approving the decision of both lower courts,
affirmed the decision of the appellate court that the contract
violated the public policy that marriage relations should be
surrounded with every safeguard and every attempt should
be made to reconcile estranged couples.98 It accordingly re-
fused to enforce the contract, leaving the attorneys an alter-
native cause of action in quantum meruit.99
The court in Aucoin found Butler indistinguishable and
invalidated the contingent fee contract, pointing out that
nothing in its opinion would bar plaintiff from filing an action
in quantum meruit for services rendered. The judgment
95. She contended that her husband, as head and master of the commu-
nity, had agreed with the attorneys in his tort action on a contingency fee of
one-third, which fee had to be deducted before any distribution of the funds
to the two spouses. She also contended that in the absence of any written
contract between plaintiff attorney and herself, the contract was one of
mandate, revocable at will by the principal, which power she had exercised.
And finally, she asserted that plaintiff was not entitled to a lien on the
proceeds of the settlement under LA. R.S. 9:5001 (1950), because this was not
the type of judgment countenanced by that statute.
96. 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974).
97. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1974
Term-Professional Responsibility, 35 LA. L. REV. 420 (1974).
98. The court cited Halls v. Cartwright, 18 La. Ann. 414 (1866), Meyer v.
Howard, 136 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) and other cases for these
propositions.
99. In this particular case, unlike Aucoin, the attorney had pleaded
quantum meruit as an alternative cause of action. The trial court, while
rejecting the 10% contingency fee under the contract (which would have
yielded a fee of some $72,000), awarded $25,000 on the quantum meruit claim.
The appellate court reduced that amount to $12,000, but the supreme court
reinstated the original award.
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seems correct, particularly in view of the fact that an attor-
ney's fee in such circumstances is an obligation of the hus-
band as head and master of the community, payable on a
quantum meruit basis whether reconciliation or dissolution is
the final outcome of the litigation.1 0 0 Thus there is no reason,
as noted by the court in Butler and reiterated by the court in
Aucoin, to assert the usual justification for a contingent fee
arrangement that it allows one who could not otherwise af-
ford counsel to procure adequate representation.
100. See, e.g., Barranger, Barranger & Jones v. Farmer, 289 So. 2d 295
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) and the cases cited therein.
